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BRIEF OF J. P. KOCH, INC.

Nature of the Case
J.P. Koch, Inc., Respondent in this appeal (hereinafter
referred to as "Koch"), agrees with the Statement of the Nature
of the Case contained in the Brief of Malouf Investment Company,
Appellant herein

(herei~after

referred to as "Malouf").

Disposition in Lower Court
Before answering or otherwise pleading to Malouf's Complaint,
Koch filed a Motion to Dismiss Malouf's Complaint as against it,
asserting that Malouf's. Complaint failed to state a claim against
Koch upon which relief could be granted for the reason of lack of
privity between Malouf and Koch.

The Court granted the Motion to

Dismiss.
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Relief Sought on Appeal
Koch respectfully requests that the appeal of Malouf be
dismissed as it has not been brought pursuant to entry of a
final judgment.

In the alternative, Koch requests that the

action taken by the lower court be affirmed in all respects.
Further, Koch requests that it be awarded its costs incurred
on appeal.
Statement of Facts
Koch adds to Malouf's Statement of Facts the statement that
"the real estate trade referred to in the first paragraph of
Malouf's Statement of Facts was between Malouf and Mountain
States Telephone and Telegraph Company, who, in turn, acquired
the building from Roger Boyer and Kem

c.

Gardner," which facts

are set forth in Malouf's Complaint at Paragraph 3.

Koch does

not controvert the remainder of Malouf's Statement of Facts
regarding the allegations made in Malouf's Complaint and the
disposition in the lower court.
Argument
I

THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF THE LOWER COURT
WAS NOT A FINAL ORDER AND, THEREFORE,
JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS APPEAL HAS NOT
BEEN CONFERRED UPON THIS COURT BY RULE 72,
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Malouf's Docketing Statement, at Paragraph 1, states that
"Rule 72, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for an appeal
to the Supreme Court from all final orders and judgments," and
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relies upon this portion of Rule 72 as the authority believed
to confer jurisdiction on this Court to hear the appeal.
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
as follows:
When more than one claim for relief is
presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
claim, and/or when multiple parties are
involved, the court may direct the entry of
a final judgment as to one or more but fewer
than all of the claims or parties only upon
an express determination by the court that
there is no just reason for delay and upon
an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination
and direction, any order or other form of
decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the
rights and liabilities of fewer than all of
the parties shall not terminate the action
as to any of the claims or parties, and the
6rder or other form of decision is subject
to revision at any time before the entry of
judgment adjudicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of all the parties.
As set forth in Malouf 's Statement of Facts, Malouf brought
this action against Roger Boyer, Kem

c.

Gardner and Koch.

The

Order of Dismissal entered by the lower court as to Koch adjudicates the liabilities of fewer than all the parties.

There being

no express direction for the entry of judgment by the lower court,
the Order of Dismissal is not a final order upon which jurisdiction to hear this appeal has been conferred upon this Court by
Rule 72 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
In Kennedy v. New Era Indus., Inc., 600 P.2d 534, 536, 537
(Utah 1979), this Court set forth constitutional, statutory and
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-4case law in support of its dismissal of an appeal of a judgment

in favor of one, but less than all, of the defendants in an action,
The Court stated:
In the case at hand, the order entered by the
trial court clearly was not a final order.
The action against other defendants and Rosenberger' s cross-claim remains alive.
•

•

•

•

The order appealed from in this case was
entered by the trial court without a Rule 54
(b) determination, and this Court has not
entered an order pursuant to Rule 72(b), per~
mitting an interlocutory appeal.
•

•

•

•

The lost time and effort occasioned by the
briefing and oral argument in this case is a
small price to pay for insisting that the
parties comply with the rules of procedure
so that the proper relationship between this
court and the trial court may be maintained.
The reasoning set forth in Kennedy, supra, is directly applicable
to the instant appeal, which should also be dismissed.
II
SECTION 70A-2-318, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
DOES NOT GRANT MALOUF A CAUSE OF ACTION
UPON ANY WARRANTY OF KOCH BECAUSE MALOUF
CANNOT BE A THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY.

Malouf acquired a building as the result of a real property
trade with Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company, who
had purchased the building from Roger Boyer and Kem

c.

Gardner,

who were the original owners of the building in which Koch, as the
construction subcontractor, installed heating and air conditioni~
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Therefore, the question of the extension of any warranty on the
part of Koch to Malouf depends upon the law regarding vertical,
as opposed to horizontal, privity.
The problem of privity of contract in breach
of warranty actions is met on two planes.
The issue of horizontal privity raises the
question whether persons other than the buyer
of defective goods can recover from the
buyer's immediate seller on a warranty theory.
On the other hand, the question of vertical
privity is whether parties in the distributive
chain prior to the immediate seller can be
held liable to the ultimate purchaser for loss
caused by the defective product. Section 2-318
of the Uniform Commercial Code does not purport to deal with vertical privity and Official
Comment 3 to Section 2-318 states specifically
that the section is not intended to enlarge or
restrict the developing case law on whether the
seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain. Thus, at the outset of any case
dealing with horizontal privity lies the prerequisite that the buyer himself could have
maintained the action for breach of warranty
against the given defendant under the ruling
case law of a particular jurisdiction. Annot.
100 A.L.R. 3d, 743 at 749 (1980}.
The version of Section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code
adopted in the State of Utah is intended to extend a seller's
warranty not only to his buyer, but to any person who may reasonably be expected to use his buyer's goods.

Once the seller's

immediate buyer resells the goods (a vertical transfer), he preeludes any subsequent third-party or horizontal beneficiary of
that warranty.

Any further extension of the seller's warranty

must be based upon vertical privity.

Thus, where Malouf is itself

a buyer, it must rely upon the common law of vertical privity to
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establish any warranty coverage.

Malouf is not a third-party

beneficiary of any warranty coverage which may have been extended
to another party prior to Malouf in the vertical chain of sales.
III
ASSUMING KOCH WAS DEEMED A "SELLER"
WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, THERE WOULD STILL BE
NO PRIVITY AS BETWEEN KOCH AND MALOUF.
Malouf's Brief, at Pages 8 and 9, cites Carver v. Denn, 117

u.

180, 214 P.2d 118 (1950), in support of the proposition that

Koch is a "seller," as opposed to a mere installer of the

heati~

and air conditioning system, a proposition which is not at issue
in this appeal.
Malouf has deleted a sentence from its citation, which
sentence sets forth the crucial factor in distinguishing Carver
from the factual situation in this appeal.

The citation follows,

with Malouf's deletion underlined:
We believe the activies of the plaintiff
amounted to considerably more than those
of a mere installer. It is true that he
did the installation work, and that he
was called in to give an estimate on what
the installation would cost. But in his
estimate he included the cost of all the
equipment to be used in the installation
and he provided and sold all of the equipment, presumably at a prof it, which the
defendant agreed to purchase. The equipment and the labor were charged by the
plaintiff to the defendant, and the defendant is not indebted to anyone else for
any of the equipment installed. We fail
to see how the plaintiff can be the seller
for the purpose of receiving the prof its
from the transaction and then successfully
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establish himself a mere installer for the
purpose of avoiding the responsibilities
of a seller.
Even if Koch was a "seller," as opposed to an installer, Malouf
has not claimed that Koch sold the air conditioning and heating
systems to Malouf.

Thus, although Koch may have been a "seller,"

that assumption adds nothing as far as evidencing any vertical
privity as between Koch and Malouf.
IV
THE RULING CASE LAW OF THIS JURISDICTION PROVIDES NO PRECEDENT WHICH WOULD
ALLOW MALOUF TO MAINTAIN AN ACTION FOR
BREACH OF WARRANTY AGAINST KOCH.
Malouf's Brief cites Annot., 16 A.L.R. 3d, 683 at 687, in
support of the proposition that the requirement of privity is
diminishing.

The citation refers to "the action for personal

injury" and "to the cases where the defective product causes
injury to other property," and concluded that in these instances,
the distinction between warranty and tort has been subsumed by
action~

for strict liability in tort.

Neither injury to person

nor property is alleged in the case on appeal.
If this action had been brought on the ground of strict liability in tort, which it was not, Malouf would still not be able
to establish a right to recovery as against Koch.
In Ernest

w.

Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158

(Utah 1979), this Court adopted the doctrine of strict liability
in tort, as set forth in Section 402A, Restatement (Second) of
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Torts.

Section 402A allows recovery for physical harm to a user

or his property, neither of which has been alleged in this case,
and applies to "unreasonably dangerous" products, such danger not
having been alleged in this case.
In Hahn, supra at 157, this Court cited Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d
897 (1963), as set forth in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.
2d 725, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162 (1978), which was again
cited by Malouf in its Brief at Page 8.

The citation reads:

we fastened strict liability on a manufacturer who placed on the market a defective
product even though both privity and
notice of breach of warranty were lacking.
The Court went on to state:
We rejected both contract and warranty
theories, express or implied, as the basis
for liability.
The instant case was brought on a warranty theory which was
rejected as the basis for liability in Greenman.

The "Greenman

Rule" was the rule later adopted as Section 402A, Restatement
(Second) of Torts (see Hahn, supra at 156), and which, as has
been discussed, is inapplicable to this case.
Annot. 16 A.L.R. 3d 683 at 687 (1967), cited by Malouf, regarding the diminishing requirement of privity, goes on to state:
There remains considerable doubt as to the
liability of the privity concept insofar
as it applies to a cause of action by the
ultimate purchaser against a manufacturer
or other person in the chain of product
distribution, where the only damage claimed
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is that resulting to the product itself,
or consequential damage flowing from the
defective condition otherwise than by a
violent accident causing injury to a person or to other property.
t

Malouf's Brief has cited no case law wherein this Court has
ruled that the requirement of privity as between the ultimate
purchaser and another person in the chain of product distribu1

H1

tion has been dispensed within a breach of warranty claim.

The

n

better reasoned cases in surrounding jurisdictions have ruled

~:

that the vertical privity requirement may not be ignored.

These

cases include Daughtry v. Jet Aeration Co., 592 P.2d 631 (Wash.
1979); Davis v. Homasote Co., 574 P.2d 1116 (Ore. 1978); Salmon
River Sportsman Camps Inc. v. Cessna Air Co., 544 P.2d 306 (Ida.
1975), and Eck v. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., ·453 P.2d 366 (Ariz.
1969).

Furthermore, authority contra, for example, Old Albany

Estates v. Highland Carpet Mills, 604 P.2d 849 (Okla. 1979), is
~I

concerned with removing the middlemen as obstacles between the
manufacturer and the ultimate purchasers in the chain of product
distribution.
In this case, the "chain of product distribution" had ended
before Malouf's purchase.

The product had been sold to, and used

by, Roger Boyer and Kem C. Gardner, the initial consumers, and
then resold to and used by Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company before being traded to Malouf.

The policy

considerations in those cases not requiring vertical privity so
as to prevent a manufacturer from shielding itself by the use of
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Such considerations should not

be extended so as to eliminate the requirement of privity despite
an indefinite number of resales and trades of used property after
having left the "chain of product distribution."
Summary
The Appeal of Malouf should be dismissed for the reason that
it has not been taken pursuant to entry of a final Order and,
therefore, jurisdiction to hear the appeal has not been conferred
upon this Court by Rule 72(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Malouf cannot claim that it need not establish vertical
privity in a breach of warranty claim by invocation of Section
70A-2-318, Utah Code Annotated.

Section 70A-2-318 applies to

horizontal privity only and, thus, is inapplicable to this
case.
Whether or not Koch is a "seller," as opposed to an "installer," has no effect upon this appeal.

Admittedly, Koch did

not sell to Malouf and, thus, there is a lack of vertical privity.
There is no case law in this jurisdiction holding that verti-""""""'
cal privity is not to be required in a claim by a consumer upon a
seller in a breach of warranty action.

Where, as in this case,

the consumer is not within the "chain of product distribution,"
there is no policy consideration which would indicate that such a
holding would be appropriate.
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Conclusion
Koch respectfully submits that the appeal of Malouf should
be dismissed or, in the alternative, that the action taken by
the lower court should be affirmed in all respects and that Koch
should be awarded its costs incurred in this appeal.
Respectfully submitted this

day of February, 1982.
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Moffat
, ~,
Attorney for J. P. Koah, Inc.
Ri~hard H.

Cristo ei J{ Burke
Attorney for J. P. Koch, Inc.
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